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I. INTRODUCTION
Parallel litigation is difficult to define and sometimes means what the speaker wants it
to mean. It may be limited to identical lawsuits with exactly the same parties and the same
claims. It may also mean any instance of two or more lawsuits that may result in claim
preclusion for some or all of the parties. It includes concepts of reactive and repetitive
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litigation,' related litigation,2 and derivative litigation. 3  Whatever it is thought to
encompass, it incurs criticism as being vexing and harassing, wasteful of the parties' and
courts' resources, and inclined to produce inconsistent results and possibly inter-
governmental discord.4 At the same time, it is a prime example of the long tradition of
forum shopping and is a useful tool for the attorney seeking either recovery or protection for
the client.
Contradictory policies have also been a problem. Courts' authority and willingness to
remedy parallel litigation draws on a number of conflicting doctrines and policies: honoring
plaintiffs choice of forum, favoring the first-filed lawsuit, reluctance to dismiss an action
that has proper jurisdiction and venue, avoidance of waste, convenience to parties, and
respect paid to coordinate courts and governments and, in state-federal conflicts,
federalism.
5
International litigation has the additional problem of the different approaches of the
common law and civil law countries. Common law jurisdictions use parallel litigation
remedies that favor a multi-factor test and measure detail and nuance, but lack consistency
and predictability. Civil law jurisdictions use code-based remedies with more rigid rules
and less recognition of special circumstances. Both seem to allow local plaintiffs to
manipulate the litigation to a degree that undermines fairness.
The struggle-to define parallel litigation (which cases are parallel enough to justify
stopping one?) and deal with its contradictory policies-is problematic even within the
United States. International litigation amplifies the problem, and moreover, amplifies the
policy concerns over waste, harassment, and judgment consistency. In the past few decades,
treaties and model laws have addressed the issue, with varying approaches and results. This
article will examine thirteen of those efforts, commenting on their content, approach, and
merits. It will do so against a background of existing remedies under the common law and
civil law for international parallel litigation.
4. The Settings
Parallel litigation occurs in four distinct settings. The first is intra-jurisdictional-
within the same jurisdiction, such as within Texas or within the U.S. federal system,
governed entirely by that jurisdiction's internal law. The second is intra-union-in two or
more states that are members of a constitutional (the United States) or treaty-based union
(the European Union), both of which may be governed by the forum state's local law, by
interstate compacts, or by federally imposed law. The third is state-federal-in a court of a
I. "Repetitive actions [are] multiple suits on the same claim by the same plaintiff against the same
defendant. [A reactive action] is a separate suit filed by a defendant in the first action against the plaintiff in the
first action, [usually] seeking a declaratory judgment [of nonliability in the first action] ... or asserting an
affirmative claim [arising] out of the same transaction or occurrence as [alleged in] the first suit." James P.
George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REv. 769, 774 (1999).
2. Related litigation may refer to "separate suits involving similar parties or issues to which claim preclusion
may not apply, but [which are] eligible for issue preclusion and [to some extent], subject to... [criticism as]
wasteful litigation." Id.
3. Examples of derivative litigation include (1) a first suit for liability, with a second suit by the defendant's
insurer seeking a declaration of nonliability on defendant's policy, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court,
861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993); and (2) an underlying action in which an attorney has allegedly committed
malpractice, with a second action by the client against the attorney, e.g., Adams v. Paul, 904 P.2d 1205 (Cal.
1995)." Derivative litigation will ordinarily not qualify for parallel litigation remedies, but could in some
circumstances.
4. George, supra note 1, at 776.
5. Id. at 776-77.
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federally subordinated state, and in a court of its federal parent, which raises special issues
of federalism in the United States, governed by federal common law. The fourth is
international-in entirely distinct states not bound by a federal system or a comprehensive
treaty, where the parallel litigation remedy may be governed by local law, a specific (often
bilateral) treaty, or international custom.
This discussion will address primarily the second and fourth categories of parallel
litigation-intra-union and international. The international category is obvious from the
title of this article. The intra-union choice is less obvious, but is included because it offers
examples of current model laws and treaties that are being compared in this article.
In all four settings, the approaches by courts, legislators, and the drafters of treaties
and model laws have basic similarities and significant differences. In instances of similarity,
however, we must avoid concluding that the law is homologous when it is not. In many
jurisdictions there have been too few cases to permit development of a well-considered
policy for dealing with jurisdictional conflicts. Moreover, the emergence of a more
cohesive international community may cause changes in the law before it has a chance to
develop locally.
B. The Remedies-Five Responses to Parallel Litigation
Within these four settings, up to five remedies for parallel litigation may be available:
(1) do nothing and continue to litigate both cases; (2) transfer and consolidate the cases into
one case; (3) stay or temporarily suspend one of the cases awaiting the outcome and
possible preclusive effect of the active litigation; (4) dismiss all but one of the cases; and (5)
enjoin a litigant from pursuing another case. The definitions below provide a common entry
point for their application in the various jurisdictional conflicts.
1. Do Nothing
In the interstate, state-federal, and international settings, the mere duplication of
actions is not necessarily grounds for any remedy absent a treaty. Many jurisdictions
presumptively or conclusively allow the local action to continue, with the first-to-judgment
having whatever preclusive effect it may have on the other. In the United States, for
example, except for actions concerning real property, there is no outright bar to parallel or
related lawsuits in state and federal courts.
6 This is also true in several foreign countries,
7
6. See, e.g., Princess Lida of Thum & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1938); Laker Airways, Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.
No. 7 v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-19 (1976); White Light Prods., Inc. v. On The Scene Prods., Inc., 660
N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
7. See J.J. FAWCETT, DECLINING JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995) (discussing a variety of rules
that either ignore foreign litigation or allow discretion to stay the local case). Countries using these rules include




but not all. 8 The do-nothing remedy is usually tempered by a discretionary power to grant
one of the other four remedies below.9
2. Transfer and Consolidation
Transfers and consolidations are distinct procedural functions, available only within
the same jurisdiction. That may be changing. Currently there are interjurisdictional means
of moving disputes, for example by forum non conveniens or by enforcing a forum selection
agreement, but this is accomplished by dismissing in one forum and refiling in the other.
There are also proposals for interjurisdictional transfers in the form of uniform acts and
treaties, but no jurisdictions have signed on. 10 Within a single jurisdiction, transferring a
case for consolidation with a parallel case is often unnecessary. Instead, parties merely
amend one of the lawsuits to add the necessary claims and parties from the other lawsuit.'"
Transfer and consolidation may be necessary, however, to preserve claims that for any
reason may not be added by amendment, for example, where a limitations period has run.
Other reasons are to use discovery gathered in the transferred case, and to take advantage of
the transferor court's preliminary rulings which would be lost if the case were simply
dismissed.
3. Stays
A stay is a court's temporary suspension of the prosecution of its own case, although
the term is sometimes used to describe a temporary suspension that one court imposes on
another, as in a bankruptcy stay. Stays are imposed for parallel litigation where the court
wishes to defer to an action in another court, but where it may be necessary to reactivate the
case if the other litigation does not result in final judgment, or if that other judgment is not
entitled to preclusion in the forum issuing the stay. In the United States, "abatement" is
sometimes used for stay, although that term can also mean dismissal.' 2 In civil law usage,
the term "suspension" in European legal usage appears to operate as a stay, that is, a
temporary cessation of litigation.
8. Germany and Switzerland require the suspension of a local case when a parallel foreign case is likely to be
recognized there. FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 196-97 (Germany), 389-90 (Switzerland). Some Japanese courts
also apply this rigid approach. Id. at 313. Note that several of the countries which do not have the mechanical
German approach may nonetheless stay a local action if the foreign one will probably be recognized, such as in
France, id. at 181, but the decision is discretionary and the court may allow both cases to proceed.
9. See George, supra note 1, at 777; see, e.g., infra notes 33-41 (U.S. federal court stays and dismissals of
parallel international litigation); infra notes 42-57 (U.S. federal court anti-suit injunctions against parallel foreign
cases). Unlike this general rule for common law remedies for parallel litigation, the conventions and model laws
discussed in this article are a mix of discretionary and non-discretionary approaches.
10. See Unif. Law Comm'rs, Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
uniformact summaries/uniformacts-s-utola.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2002), discussed infra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text.
11. See George, supra note 1, at 820.
12. The confusion apparently stems from the contrary meanings of "abatement" in law (dismissal) and
equity (temporary suspension). See Pringle v. Sizer, 2 S.C. 59, 68 (1870), discussed in George, supra note 1, at
779.
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4. Dismissals
Dismissals, like stays, are remedies that courts impose on their own cases. They are
less preferred because a dismissal (1) terminates an otherwise proper lawsuit (that is, one
with proper jurisdiction and venue); (2) upends the timetable in that case; and (3) assumes a
perfect identity with the other case that will not result in the non-meritorious loss of any
claims or fundamental rights. Dismissals are ordered for parallel litigation in lieu of stays
where it is clear that the other litigation will be adequate to protect all parties' interests and
where all jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied.
5. Antisuit Injunctions
A fifth option is to ask the court to enjoin the opposing party from pursuing the other
case. This is especially appropriate when the other court may not grant a motion to stay its
own action. The injunction applies only to the party being enjoined; it does not apply to the
court or judge presiding over the parallel case-i.e., courts of original jurisdiction may not
enjoin each other. However, an appellate court with jurisdiction over a trial court (that is
part of the same state system or federal circuit) may freeze the litigation in the lower court
where a motion for stay was improperly denied.
One treatise describes four reasons for antisuit injunctions: (1) stopping litigation of
the same dispute in another forum; 13 (2) consolidating related but not identical claims in the
moving party's preferred forum; 14 (3) stopping the relitigation in another forum to protect
the prevailing party in a completed case;' 5 and (4) preventing the opponent from seeking an
antisuit injunction in the other forum. 16  Stays and dismissals may achieve the same
objectives, but antisuit injunctions are effective where the other forum is unlikely to grant
the stay or dismissal.
The antisuit injunction is the most controversial of the remedies for parallel litigation
because it interferes with another court's power, often in another state or country. As noted
above, the injunction is against the party, not against the other court.17 Some courts and
commentators, however, suggest that this distinction is meaningless and that the other forum
may perceive that its powers are being challenged or compromised. 18
One final point is the regression of these remedies. As one ascends through the local,
regional, and finally international hierarchy, the availability of remedies diminishes. That
13. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 475 (3d ed. 1996) (citing
Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1996); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981)).
14. Seattle Totems Hockey Club Inc. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981).
15. Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 398 F.2d 810 (5th Cir.
1968).
16. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Owens-lI., Inc. v.
Webb, 809 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
17. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927; Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1986); Turner v.
Grovit, [2002] 1 All E.R. 320 (H.L. 2001).
18. See Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 306-07 (citing Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937); see also Total Minatome
Corp. v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 851 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Trevor C. Hartley,
Comity and the Use of Antisuit Injunctions in International Litigation, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 487 (1987)
(discussing 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); William Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational
Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1663, 1713 (1992)
(citing George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L., 589, 629 (1990).
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is, the more distinct the jurisdictions, the less likely that one of these remedies will be
applied. Within the same jurisdiction, courts will readily transfer or dismiss parallel cases
based on policies of efficiency and economy. Where jurisdictional boundaries are crossed
(i.e., interstate, state-federal, international), there is a greater reluctance to interfere. The
greater the boundary crossed, the greater the reluctance. This hesitance includes both a
reluctance to stay or dismiss the local case out of fear that the plaintiff will not have an
adequate forum in another jurisdiction and an even greater reluctance to enjoin the other
action. This makes perfect sense, but parties sometimes fail to consider or accept this
reality.
C. Universals in Parallel Litigation
A few features of parallel litigation are nearly universal. Foremost is the notion of
exclusive jurisdiction for the first-filed,case concerning immovable property (and to a lesser
extent, movable property), provided that the court has jurisdiction over the property. 19 A
second universal is the importance, at least in domestic parallels of winning the race to the
courthouse, to take advantage of a first-filed (or first-seized) rule that may range from
automatic deference to the first-filed case
20 to presumptions favoring the first-filed case.
2 1
The universal aspect of this rule is its presence as a factor, and not its likelihood of
prevailing. It is most common in domestic parallels, particularly in intrajurisdictional ones.
It is now, however, being applied to international parallels and is a factor in motions to
stay22 and in forum non conveniens dismissals.
2 3
A third universal is the problem of identifying whether the cases are sufficiently
similar to warrant judicial interference with party autonomy. To the extent that identity of
19. The leading U.S. case is Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939): "We have
said that the principle applicable to both federal and state courts that the court first assuming jurisdiction over
property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other, is not restricted to cases where
property has been actually seised ..... Id. at 466. Princess Lida was a domestic case, but the rule applies
equally in requiring second-filed U.S. cases to yield to foreign courts. See, e.g., Dailey v. Nat'l Hockey League,
987 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing 305 U.S. 456 (1939). The European view is expressed in Article 16
of the Brussels Convention, providing exclusive jurisdiction in the state in which the property is located.
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968,
1978 O.J. (L 304) 77 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
20. Examples of fixed rules favoring the first-filed case (or in some cases, the first-seized court) include the
ZIVILPROZEPORDNUNG [CIVIL PROCEDURE STATUTE] (F.R.G.) § 261 Nr. I ZPO, discussed in FAWCETF, supra
note 7, at 196; the CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] (Italy), art. 39, discussed in
FAWCEI", supra note 7, at 281; and the Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 21.
21. See, e.g., W. Gulf Mar. Ass'n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 730 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that
a federal court should have heeded the first-filed rule and dismissed its second-filed case in deference to a federal
court in New York). Illinois and New York statutorily authorize a discretionary presumption favoring the first-
filed case. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-619(a)(3) (1993); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 321 l(a)(4) (Consol. 1994). Some
states do not recognize this presumption for interstate or foreign parallels. E.g., Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 382
N.E.2d 55, 58 (11. App. Ct. 1978); Pesquera del Pacifico S. de R.L. v. Super. Ct., 201 P.2d 553, 554-55 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1949).
22. The Colorado River/Moses Cone test, developed for state-federal parallels but used for international
parallels, includes as factors the order of filing and the relative progress of the two actions. See infra notes 33-36
and accompanying text; see also Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, S.A. v. Naiz, S.A., 615 So.2d 233, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (abating a second-filed action in deference to one in Spain).
23. See, e.g., Meadows v. ICI, [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 181, 189 (Q.B. 1989). Theforum non conveniens test
in the United States is a balancing test of "public and private factors," both of which would seem to favor, at least
presumptively, a forum that had significantly progressed with the case over one which had not. See Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). But see George, supra note 1, at 945 (arguing that the progress of the two
cases should not be a factor where defendant meets its high burden of proving the other forum more convenient).
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the parties and claims is a factor, both the meaning of "identical" and the required degree of
similarity varies broadly among jurisdictions and sometimes among courts within a single
jurisdiction.
II. COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW DIFFERENCES
A. The Common Law Approach
1. The United States
a. The Multifaceted Approach
State and federal parallel litigation rules in the United States are derived almost
entirely from common law and equity. Common law reasoning is inductive and focused on
particularities, sharply contrasting with the deductive process inherent in statutory and code
applications. This contrast is nowhere more apparent than in the differences between the
common law and civil law approaches to parallel litigation remedies. Judges in the United
States had great discretion in finding, fashioning, or modifying rules to fit a result that
seemed just or appropriate. This practice led to a set of rules with nuances that could
address a variety of situations with maximum attention to the particular facts of each case.
These nuanced rules, in turn, avoided a weakness of the code and statutory systems, in
which judges must characterize the dispute in order to fit it into a code provision, sometimes
resulting in forced fits. The weakness was that the same inductive process could, in
egregious fact patterns, lead to rules that did not fit well with most cases.
The common law system, at least in the United States, composed a series of multi-
factored tests with rebuttable presumptions. These presumptions included a presumption
favoring party autonomy that encourages allowing parties to proceed with multiple lawsuits
except in extreme circumstances;24 a contrary presumption favoring the first-filed action in
domestic parallels;25 a presumption favoring forum selection clauses;26 a presumption
against declaratory actions; 27 and a presumption against antisuit injunctions, especially in
24. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. No. 7 v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976)
(referring to "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them,"
followed by a test that allows deviations from that obligation); White Light Prods., Inc. v. On The Scene Prods.,
Inc., 660 N.Y.S.2d 568, 574-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that a dismissal of a second-filed New York
action in deference to one in California was an abuse of discretion absent a forum non conveniens evaluation).
This party-autonomy presumption is generally ignored in intrajurisdictional parallels that tend to favor the stay,
dismissal, or transfer of duplicate lawsuits. See George, supra note 1, at 785-819.
25. This applies particularly in the intrafederal setting. See, e.g., W. Gulf Mar. Ass'n, 751 F.2d at 730. See
supra note 21 for additional references.
26. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Int'l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77
F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1996).
27. E.g., Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995) (federal-state parallel); Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-
Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952) (intrafederal parallel); Space Master Int'l, Inc. v. Porta-Kamp Mfg. Co.,
794 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (interstate parallel). There is little evidence that
the presumption against declaratory judgment actions applies in international litigation. See George, supra note 1,
at 904-69 (discussing the various tests regarding foreign parallel litigation under state and federal law in the
United States). None of these tests turn on whether one action is for declaratory judgment. Id.
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international litigation.28  Some of these multi-factored tests are balancing tests, some of
which require the balancing of both private and governmental interests.29
Overall, courts in the United States offer a full range of remedies. Interestingly, this
holds true in federal courts even for intrafederal parallels, where transfer and consolidation
might seem the only necessary solutions.30 The legal standard is typically discretionary.3'
b. Two Examples
Although there are many nuances to parallel litigation, two examples illustrate the
United States' common law approach to parallel litigation.
i. Stays and Dismissals of the Local Action in International Litigation
The first example is the federal common law approach to a motion for stay or
dismissal of an in personam action that is duplicated in a foreign court that does not involve
title to property and is not subject to a forum clause. Any of three doctrines may apply, with
the first two borrowed from domestic parallel doctrines, and the third a true international
law remedy.
The first doctrine is drawn from Landis v. North American Co.,32 designed for
intrafederal parallel cases, and the second is from Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States,3 3 dealing with parallel state-federal cases. Because federalism
plays a role in Colorado River that is missing in Landis (and that is inappropriate for
international cases), one might expect the tests to differ. In fact their elements are similar,
but a principal distinction is that Colorado River has a stronger presumption for retaining
28. "[P]arallel proceedings on the same in personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed
simultaneously, at least until a judgment is reached in one [jurisdiction] which can be pled as res judicata in the
other." Gau Shan v. Banker's Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
29. The Colorado River balancing test is used in considering stays and dismissals in state-federal and
international parallels. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. No. 7 v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The
Landis balancing test is used for the same issues in intrafederal and international parallels. Landis v. N. Am. Co.,
299 U.S. 248 (1936); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1994) is a statutory balancing test used for intrafederal forum non
conveniens. See, e.g., Muller v. Walt Disney Prods., 822 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); and the GulfOil
balancing test applies to international forum non conveniens motions in U.S. federal courts. See 330 U.S. 501
(1947). State courts have similar tests. See George, supra note 1, at 820-49. Antisuit injunctions are multi-
factor tests, but tend to focus on the bad faith motives or vexatious results of the other litigation, rather than a
balancing of interests. See infra notes 42-45.
30. Transfer: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) permits consolidation of federal lawsuits having a
common question of law or fact, but does not address transfer, which must be done under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(c)
(1994) (transfer within the federal division), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (transfer to another division in the same federal
district), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (inconvenient forum transfer, including those based on forum selection agreements),
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (transfer to correct improper venue), or 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (multidistrict transfer of complex
multiparty cases for pretrial purposes only). Stay: See, e.g., Kerotest Mfg. Co., 342 U.S. at 180 (1952) (affirming
a stay of a second-filed patent case). Dismissal: The dismissal grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12
may not be used to remedy parallel litigation, including intrafederal parallels. Instead, federal common law
governs parallel litigation. See, e.g., Ulmet v. United States, 888 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th Cir. 1989). Antisuit
injunction: Federal courts may enjoin parties from pursuing parallel actions in other federal courts. See, e.g.,
Win. Gluckin & Co. v. Int'l Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1969) (upholding New York federal court's
injunction against parallel patent case in Georgia federal court).'
3 1. See generally George, supra note 1.
32. 299 U.S. at 248.
33. 424 U.S. at 800.
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the challenged case and allowing both actions to proceed until one reaches judgment.34
Colorado River, thus, has a higher burden of proof, at least as stated, but whether it is higher
in application is another question.
The Landis test has seven factors: (1) comity; (2) the adequacy of relief available in
the other forum; (3) judicial efficiency; (4) the degree of identity of the parties and issues in
the two cases; (5) the likelihood of prompt disposition in the other forum; (6) convenience
to the parties, counsel, and witnesses; and (7) the possibility of prejudice if the stay or
dismissal is granted. 35 The Colorado River test (as modified by the Moses Cone case36) has
nine factors: (1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over a res, if applicable; (2) the
relative convenience of the alternative forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal
litigation; (4) which case was first filed; (5) the relative progress of the two actions; (6) the
extent to which federal law applies; (7) any other special factors (in Colorado River, it was
the government's willingness to litigate similar claims in state court); (8) the adequacy of
the alternative forum in protecting the litigants' rights; and (9) whether the action in the
immediate forum was vexatious or filed in bad faith.37 These factors may be summarized as
federalism, comity, fairness to parties, and judicial economy and could cynically be titled:
"The Erie Doctrine Meets Gulf Oil v. Gilbert.'' 38 The original cases favored dismissal as a
remedy but some have now turned to stays, especially when dealing with foreign litigation.
3 9
Landis has no presumption favoring ongoing jurisdiction, while Colorado River
emphasizes federalism (which should not apply in international litigation) and has a higher
burden of proof. Both doctrines are discretionary, both use balancing tests, and both can
lead to stay or dismissal.
The third doctrine is comity, which encourages deference to foreign acts and
judgments. Its vague standards have resulted in comparatively less use in international
parallel litigation in the United States.
40
ii. Federal Injunctions Against Foreign Litigation
U.S. federal law permits antisuit injunctions, but the federal circuits are split on the
standards. The more liberal standard (in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits) permits an
34. See id. at 818.
35. See Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (C.D. Pa. 1974).
36. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
37. Id. at 15-28.
38. For readers who know neither doctrine, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) is the currently-
disarrayed test for choosing between state and federal law to be applied in a federal case where both may be
appropriate (the disarray is from confusion about the proper test to be applied, see Gasperini v. Ctr.-for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996)). GulfOil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), is the federal common law
balancing test forforum non conveniens. For critics of balancing tests, especially those who dislike governmental
interest analysis, this extended Colorado River test must be dismaying, both with its number and categories of
factors that include assessing the degree of claim identity, federal interest in applying federal law, party
convenience, and so on. For those of us who like or tolerate balancing tests, Colorado River is workable because
in close cases, the court should allow both cases to continue. Stays or dismissals should occur only where the
factors clearly point to the other forum.
39. E.g., Lumen Constr., Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. Comity as U.S. law stems from Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), which addressed the recognition
of judgments from foreign countries, announcing the requirement of respect for the legislative, executive, and
judicial acts of foreign sovereigns. Id. at 164. It is arguably misapplied to parallel litigation, which, as a pending
lawsuit, does not involve any final sovereign decree. It is nonetheless occasionally applied as the sole basis for
deference to a parallel foreign case, e.g., Ensign-Bickford Co. v. ICI Explosives U.S.A. Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1018
(D. Conn. 1993). See generally George, supra note 1, at 910-12, 971-74.
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injunction if the foreign action would: (1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the
injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court's in rem or quasi in
rem jurisdiction; or (4) prejudice other equitable considerations. 4 1 The stricter standard (in
the Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits) limits foreign antisuit injunctions: (1) to protect the
forum's jurisdiction; or (2) to prevent evasion of the forum's important public policies.42
This view includes the concept that a duplication of the parties and issues, alone, is not
sufficient to justify a foreign antisuit injunction.43 China Trade added that the need to
protect a federal court's jurisdiction from a parallel foreign action only occurs (1) when the
jurisdiction is in rem or quasi in rem or (2) in in personam actions, the foreign proceeding is
an attempt to establish exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.4
This brief description of U.S. law on parallel litigation omits much, and readers should
consult other sources for a more thorough discussion. 45  But it does illustrate the multi-
factored approach to questions addressed more abruptly in code systems.
2. The United Kingdom
English remedies for international parallel litigation are generally consistent with those
in the United States. English courts apply the doctrine of lis alibi pendens to consider
staying or dismissing the local action46 and distinguish between repetitive and reactive
suits. 47 Forum non conveniens is an available remedy both in parallel cases and otherwise.
4 8
Antisuit injunctions are available when the ends of justice require it, and if the foreign
action would be vexatious or oppressive. 49 For parallel cases involving other signatories to
the Brussels or Lugano Conventions, English courts apply the somewhat civil-law-based
directives of those rules, although a recent case confirmed that English courts may issue
antisuit injunctions in cases otherwise governed by the Brussels Convention, provided that
the foreign action was an unconscionable abuse of process.
50
41. In re Unterweser Reederei GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 446
F.2d 907 (1971), rev'd on other grounds; Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Seattle Totems
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1981); Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
42. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-33 (D.C. Cir. 1984); China
Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1987); Sea Containers, Ltd. v. Stena,
A.B., 890 F.2d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Gau Shan Co. v. Banker's Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (6th
Cir. 1992).
43. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 928, quoted in Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355.
44. China Trade & Dev. Corp., 837 F.2d at 36-37. This narrower standard has been affirmed without
significant discussion in the Eleventh Circuit, after adoption by an Alabama federal district court. See Mut. Serv.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala. 1992), aff'd, 3 F.3d 442 (11 th Cir. 1993).
45. See FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 401-28. See generally George, supra note 1.
46. E.g., The Abidin Daver, I A.C. 398, 408-09 (H.L. 1984). See ALBERT VENN DICEY & JOHN
HUMPHREY CARLILE MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 395-96 (Lawrence Collins ed., 1 1th ed. 1987) for a
discussion of lis alibi pendens.
47. See GEOFFREY CHESHIRE & P.M. NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-19 (Butterworth & Co.
1Oth ed. 1979) (1935).
48. E.g., Abidin Daver, 1 A.C. 398, 411-12 (H.L. 1984) (appeal taken from Eng.); Spiliada Mar. Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd., [1987] 1 A.C. 460 (H.L. 1986) (appeal taken from Eng.); see also CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note
47 at 119-22; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 46, at 389-95; FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 207-33.
49. See British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1985] 1 A.C. 58, 95 (H.L. 1984); Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, I A.C. 871 (H.L. 1987), discussed in FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 229-32;
see also CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 47, at 112-14; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 48, at 396-98.
50. Tumer v. Grovit, I All E.R. 320 (H.L. 2001).
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As with other summaries in this article, readers are cautioned that the law invariably
has far greater complexity than the general conclusions stated here. This is particularly true
of English and U.S. law, whose common law source has created a diverse case law around
these basic doctrines.
B. The Civil Law Approach
Civil law systems-based on codes-use a syllogistic reasoning process in which
various fact patterns must be characterized to fit into a particular code section, without full
regard for factual nuances. Their strength is the certainty and predictability of relatively
fixed rules. The weakness of this syllogistic process is that it does not address the variety of
special circumstances that courts encounter, and its rules do not expand with the
development of precedent (even though court decisions may influence later applications of
that code section). The author recognizes that civil law remedies cannot be described in this
brief article with any real accuracy. Just as with similar remedies for the United States, even
within a strict code system, subtleties abound both in text and in application. With that
limitation in mind, the following observations are made about civil law remedies for parallel
litigation.
Although many civil law jurisdictions use lis pendens in domestic cases, many do not
in international cases unless required by treaty.51 Those that do not use lis pendens instead
apply, at least by default, the first remedy-do nothing and await the outcome and possible
preclusive effects. 52 Preclusion has been historically less likely in international litigation,
but increasingly common under treaty. Where lispendens is applied in international parallel
cases, the effect is that the court later seized with jurisdiction is obligated to dismiss the
second case. An "identical case" is typically defined as being the same parties and the same
cause of action,53 although it is unclear how much sameness is required, and one suspects
that civil law judges may impose some unauthorized discretion here.
Civil law remedies may or may not address related cases, that is, parallels that were
not sufficiently identical to warrant lispendens dismissal. 4 Civil law jurisdictions typically
have no forum non conveniens doctrine, 55 no antisuit injunctions,56 and no presumption
51. See generally FAWCETT, supra note 7. Belgium does not apply lis pendens in international cases. Id. at
107-10. France does apply lis pendens subject to a likelihood of eventual judgment recognition in France. Id. at
180-82. Germany applies lis pendens routinely. Id. at 196-98. Greece does apply lis pendens under certain
conditions. Id. at 247-52. Italy does not apply lispendens except when required by treaty. Id. at 284-86. Japan
does, applying a "special circumstances" test somewhat like that in the United States. Id. at 310-16. The
Netherlands does apply lis pendens. Id at 336-37. Spain does apply lis pendens. CODIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE]
art. 1252. Sweden has no clear rule except where a treaty would require judgment enforcement. FAWCETT, supra
note 7, at 374-76. Switzerland does apply lispendens. Id. at 389-90. For the countries that do apply lispendens
in international cases, it is important to note that each may apply the doctrine differently, with distinct elements
and exceptions.
52. See FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 284-86.
53. The German Civil Procedure Code authorizes sua sponte dismissal of a second action between the same
parties on the same claim. § 261 11 Nr. I ZPO (F.R.G.); see FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 196. Article 39 of the
Italian Code of Civil Procedure similarly defines lis pendens. See FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 281. The French
Code applicable to domestic parallels, on the other hand, merely refers to the "same dispute." NOUVEAU CODE DE
PROCEDURE CIVILE [NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 100 (Fr.).
54. France, for example, has a domestic doctrine of connexitM that now appears possible for application in
international cases. See FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 175 n.2, 181. Greece has a similar doctrine-forum
connexitatis-but there is no indication of its availability for international parallel cases. See id. at 254. German
law has clarified that domestic remedies for staying related cases do not apply to foreign cases other than those
governed by the Brussels Convention, art. 22. See id. at 199-200.
55. See FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 10.
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against a first-filed declaratory suit. The results have the benefit of being far more
predictable than those in the United States and perhaps England but have the disadvantage
of being fairly inflexible and. somewhat capable of manipulation by, for example, winning
the race to the courthouse with a declaratory action, or by filing a second case that is not
quite identical.
III. TREATIES AND MODEL LAWS
Starting in the mid-twentieth century, treaties addressing parallel litigation in one form
or another began appearing, and somewhat later in that period, legal think-tanks such as the
Hague Convention,57 UNIDROIT,58 and the American Law Institute59 began drafting model
laws directed at the same issues. There are currently at least ten treaties or model laws,
either in force or being drafted, that address some aspect of parallel litigation. This study
includes two U.S. models designed for complex litigation that are not directed at
international litigation, but that offer definitions and structure that may be helpful.
A. European Union Conventions
1. The Brussels Convention
The Brussels Convention, properly known as the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,6 ° was the first international
model for resolving problems with parallel litigation. Its function is broader than resolving
parallel litigation, seeking to resolve conflicts of territorial jurisdiction and to promote the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases litigated in the
European Union. The Convention is limited to "civil and commercial matters" 6 1 in the
courts of contracting states, which include the states of the European Union.62 It has been
called "Europe's full faith and credit clause, 63 but functions more broadly than that of the
United States.
Articles 21 through 23 of the Convention address parallel litigation, dividing it into
three categories: (1) identical actions, (2) related actions, and (3) actions having exclusive
56. Summarizing his compilation of parallel litigation remedies in various common law and civil law
countries, Dean Fawcett concludes that antisuit injunctions are "confined to common law jurisdictions."
FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 40. The civil law discussions that follow Fawcett's summary illustrate this contention.
See id. at 186-87. A better illustration may be the current conflict regarding English courts' issuance of antisuit
injunctions in cases governed by the Brussels Convention, whose other signatories do not allow them, and who
may interpret the Brussels Convention as disallowing them. See Turner v. Grovit, I All E.R. 320 (H.L. 2001).
57. See infra note 158.
58. See infra note 180.
59. See infra note 118.
60. Brussels Convention, supra note 19.
61. The Convention defines "civil and commercial matters" by what they are not: (1) revenue, customs, or
administrative matters; (2) status arising out of matrimonial relationship, or wills and succession; (3) bankruptcy
proceedings; (4) social security; or (5) matters in arbitration. Id. art. I.
62. Contracting states currently include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Brussels
Convention, supra note 19, pmbl.; see also P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE
INTENATIONAL LAW 183-84, 187 n. 12 (Butterworth & Co. 13th ed. 1999).
63. Lee S. Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of the Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 44 (1975),
quoted in EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1006 (2d ed. 1992).
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jurisdiction (such as in rem actions). 64  The Convention uses the term "lis pendens"
ambiguously, with the heading "Lis Pendens-Related Actions" applying to the entirety of
Section 8, that is, Articles 21 through 23.65 This heading's most obvious meaning is that the
two terms "lis pendens" and "related actions" are mutually exclusive, with the title
identifying two topics covered in Section 8. Another possible meaning is that the terms are
synonymous and the intent is to state the Latin term "lis pendens" (the Convention's only
use of Latin) in English. This ambiguity is compounded by the Convention's failure to
repeat the term "lispendens" in the text of any article. The better assumption is that the first
possibility is correct because Article 21 refers to "proceedings involving the same cause of
action ... between the same parties" 66 (apparently meaning lis pendens), while Article 22
refers explicitly to "related actions," a usage more or less consistent with other European
laws.67
The Brussels Convention deals with parallel litigation as follows:
a. Identical Parallel Actions
Article 21 defines identical actions as those involving the "same cause of action
between the same parties," and provides that courts of member states must stay proceedings
until the court "first seised" perfects its jurisdiction, and once established, must dismiss or
"decline jurisdiction., 68 One term is crucial here: The "court first seised" designates the
action with priority for lis pendens, but the determination of being seised is left to local law.
Some states define "seised" as the time of filing the action or seeking summons,"9 while
other states define "seised" at a latter point, such as service of process on the defendant.7 °.
This creates problems where, for example, a German citizen files a suit in Germany but has
trouble serving process on a Swedish defendant, during which time the Swedish defendant
files a parallel case in Sweden. Under Swedish law, the Swedish court now becomes the
court first perfecting jurisdiction.7' The Convention also makes no distinction for reactive
or repetitive actions, even for declaratory judgment actions.
b. Related Actions
Related actions provide more options. Article 22 provides that any.court other than
the first filed may stay its action while the others are pending, or may decline jurisdiction if
the law of the second court permits consolidation and the court first seized has jurisdiction
over both. A related action is one "so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and
64. Brussels Convention, supra note 19, arts. 21-23.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 21.
67. Id. art. 22. The most recent example is the International Law Association's London-Leuven proposal, in
which Principle 4.1 defines lis pendens as "the same parties and the same subject matter," with Principle 4.2
addressing "related actions." Resolution No. 1/2000, Int'l Civil & Commercial Litig., Leuven/London Principles
on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters, 69TH CONFERENCE OF THE INT'L L.
AssOc. (July 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter London-Leuven Principles]. Note, however, that the
Brussels Convention defines lis pendens somewhat differently as "same cause of action" rather than "same subject
matter." Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 21.
68. Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 21.
69. See FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 34, 198-99 (Germany), 221 (United Kingdom).
70. Id. at 34, 221 (discussing the United Kingdom prior to 1992), 376 (Sweden).
71. Id. at 376.
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determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgment resulting from separate
proceedings."
C. Exclusive Jurisdiction
Exclusive jurisdiction is designated in Article 16 as including in rem actions (except
for tenancies of immovable property for six months or less), constitutional challenges,
business entity dissolution, public register validity, intellectual property registration, and
judgment enforcement.72 EU regulations provide further definitions.73 For instances of
conflicting exclusive jurisdiction, Article 23, provides that "any court other than the court
first seised shall decline jurisdiction. ' 4
d. Antisuit Injunctions
Antisuit injunctions are not authorized by the Brussels Convention, but may arguably
be invoked under national law, even when the other state has subject matter jurisdiction.75
e. Transfers and Consolidations
Transfers and consolidations are not authorized under the Brussels Convention, but as
noted above, courts may dismiss later-filed actions where transfer and consolidation are
possible under national law. It is unclear whether this deference to transfers under national
law includesforum non conveniens dismissals.
f Forum Selection Clauses
Forum selection clauses are honored, with Article 17 providing for exclusive
jurisdiction in the parties' chosen court and requiring dismissal in other courts.
7 6
g. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is not mentioned in the Brussels Convention. The current draft
of the proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
72. See id.
73. Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 22, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, reprinted in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: SELECTED TREATIES, STATUTES AND RULES 91, 101-02 (2d ed.
2001).
74. Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 23 (emphasis added).
75. Specifically, Article 24 allows litigants to apply to the courts of a contracting state for "such provisional,
including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the
courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter." Brussels Convention,
supra note 19, art. 24. As a result, civil law jurisdictions lacking antisuit injunctive relief cannot offer the remedy,
while courts in the United Kingdom can. See Turner v. Grovit, I All E.R. 320 (H.L. 2001). Note, however, that
the House of Lords' decision to enjoin Grovit from his parallel Spanish suit does not necessarily have the
agreement of other European Union members.
76. Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 17.
2002]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Judgments has a forum non conveniens provision 77 that would become national law for
signatory nations in the European Union.
In summary, the Brussels Convention:
* Defers to the first-filed action for (1) identical cases and (2) instances of two
or more courts having exclusive jurisdiction (this rule does not apply to
instances of a single court having exclusive jurisdiction or cases governed
by valid forum selection clauses);
* Allows discretionary stays for later-filed related actions;
• Enforces valid forum selection clauses;
* Further allows for dismissal of any related action (first or later-filed) where
transfer and consolidation is possible under national law; and
* Defers to local law for antisuit injunctions and other provisional relief.
The Convention's shortcomings are that it uses a rigid first-filed rule for identical cases that
makes no distinction for declaratory judgment actions or for the often-related distinction of
reactive versus repetitive claims.
2. The Lugano Convention
The Brussels Convention has a twin in the Lugano Convention, subject to minor
variations in the text and other variations in the protocols. Like the Brussels Convention, it
is also titled the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 78 and it embraces the members of the European Free Trade
Association. 9 Conflicts with the Brussels Convention are addressed in Article 54B,
providing that membership in the Lugano Convention does not prejudice members of the
European Union from seeking application of the Brussels Convention, 80 and that the Lugano
Convention will apply in any event to: (a) jurisdiction issues, where the defendant is
domiciled in the territory of a signatory state which is not a member of the European Union,
or where Articles 16 or 17 confer jurisdiction;81 (b) parallel litigation matters, when dual
proceedings are instituted in a signatory state which is not a member of the European Union
and in another state which is;82 and (c) judgment recognition and enforcement matters,
where either the judgment rendering state or the state applied to is not a member of the
European Union. 83 The Lugano Convention's provisions for parallel litigation are found in
Articles 21 and 22, numbered and worded identically to those in the Brussels Convention.
8 4
77. See Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Interim
Text from Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference (June 6-20, 2001); see also Edward C.Y.
Lau, Update on the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 ANN.
SURV. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 21 (2000).
78. 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
79. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
80. Lugano Convention, supra note 78, art. 54B(l).
81. Id. art. 54B(2)(a).
82. Id. art. 54B(2)(b).
83. Id. art. 54B(2)(c).
84. Id. arts. 21-22; Brussels Convention, supra note 19, arts. 21-22.
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3. The European Union Insolvency Convention
The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings85 briefly addresses
parallel litigation in Article 15, providing only that the "effects of insolvency proceedings
on a lawsuit pending concerning an asset or right of which the debtor has been divested shall
be governed solely by the law of the Contracting State in which that lawsuit is pending. 86
Thus, the Convention applies only to conflicts created by insolvency stays within the EU
jurisdictions. Presumably, the Brussels Convention would govern the parallel litigation
issues.
B. Proposals from the United States
1. The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act
The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act 87 is a model act for adoption
by states in the United States, directed at resolving jurisdictional conflicts in state court
actions involving interstate and international incidents.88 It addresses personal jurisdiction,
service of process, the taking of depositions outside the state for use in domestic litigation,
determination of foreign law, and proof of domestic and foreign records, but not parallel
litigation.89 It does, however, permit jurisdiction to be declined by stay or dismissed based
on a claim that the forum is inconvenient.
9
0
2. The Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act
The Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act91 is another model act from the Uniform Law
Commissioners that has yet to be adopted by any state. It is designed to replace forum non
conveniens-which involves an action's dismissal and refiling-with something akin to
nationwide venue transfer, much like the federal inconvenient forum process under Section
1404(a) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code.92 The stated reasons for transfer are (1) to serve the
fair, effective, and efficient administration of justice and (2) the convenience of the parties
and witnesses. 93 The Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act lacks any express discussion of
parallel litigation, but could be used to transfer and consolidate related actions.
85. Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223.
86. Id. art. 15.
87. UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE ACT, 13 U.L.A. 355 (1968). This act was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1962. It has
been adopted in Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4-101-16-4-108 (Michie 1999); District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-401-13-434 (1981); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, §§ 1-14 (West 2000);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.1852, 600.2114a, 600.2118a (West 1996); Pennsylvania, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5321-5329 (West 1981); Virgin Islands, 5 V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 4901-4943 (1997); and
adopted in part in New York and Oklahoma. See 13 U.L.A. 356 (General Statutory Notes).
88. See 13 U.L.A. 355 (Prefatory Note).
89. Id.
90. UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE ACT § 1.05, 13 ULA. 377 (1968) (providing that "[w]hen the
court finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay
or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just").
91. UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT, 14 U.L.A. 222 (2001).
92. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a)(1994).
93. UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT § 104, 14 U.L.A. 228 (2001).
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3. The Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act
The Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act was drafted by the American Bar Association's
Section on International Law and Practice, and was adopted by Connecticut in 1991. 9 4 Its
purpose is to encourage early determination of the adjudicating forum and to inhibit
vexatious and/or parallel litigation.95 These purposes are accomplished by blocking
judgment recognition; that is, local courts must refuse recognition of a foreign judgment
from a parallel action unless the local forum has determined the other forum to be the proper
adjudicating forum.96
The Act applies to cases where "two or more proceedings arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence were pending," and requires a party wishing to enforce a resulting
judgment to make timely application (1) to the first known court of competent jurisdiction,
(2) to the adjudicating forum after its selection, or (3) "to any court of competent
jurisdiction if the foregoing courts were not courts of competent jurisdiction." 97 Timeliness
must be "within six months of reasonable notice of two such proceedings, or of reasonable
notice of the selection of an adjudicating forum. ' 98 Judgment by an "adjudicating forum" is
binding on any person served with notice of an application to designate, and courts of an
adopting state then are required to enforce the judgment according to ordinary rules for
enforcement ofjudgments.
99
The adjudicating forum is selected by application of a multi-factor test resembling that
for common law forum non conveniens, but more detailed.'00  These factors may be
established by any evidence admissible in the adjudicating forum or other competent forum,
with a suggested list including both factual and legal evidence.' 0' Once the adjudicating
forum is determined, its selection "shall be accorded presumptive validity in this State if the
written decision determining the adjudicating forum evaluated the substance of the factors
set forth in Section 2(c).' 02
The Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act differs from other existing standards and
proposals by limiting itself to (1) a test for designating the proper forum, and (2) sanctioning
non-complying parties by denying recognition, or full faith and credit, to the judgment. The
multi-factor test for determining the appropriate forum goes well beyond most other tests.
While it does not expressly refer to reactive and repetitive litigation, or to declaratory
judgments, it does consider "the nature and extent of litigation that has proceeded over the
dispute,"'0 3 which presumably could allow a court to decline jurisdiction over a first-filed
declaratory action.
The Model Act also does not clearly specify whether it is intended for application to
related-but-not-identical litigation. Instead, its scope is merely "cases where two or more
94. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-200-50a-203 (West 1958). For the Model Act's text, see The Conflict
of Jurisdiction Model Act, reprinted in Louise Ellen Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposal to
Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT'L LAw. 21 app. I at 56 (1992).
95. This statement was deleted in the Connecticut statute, but appears in the Model Act in Section 1, titled
"Declaration of Public Policy," which further notes the Model Act's function of avoiding the enforcement of
judgments obtained in vexatious litigation, parallel proceedings, and litigation in an inconvenient forum. See
Teitz, supra note 94, at 56.
96. Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act § 2(a).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 2(b).
99. Id. § 2(c).
100. Id. § 3 (including fourteen factors somewhat too detailed to restate here).
101. Id.§4.
102. Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act § 2(c).
103. Id. § 3(m).
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proceedings aris[e] out of the same transaction or occurrence .... ,104 This broad wording
is both good and bad to litigants in parallel actions. The Model Act's scope is broad, both
as to the degree of relatedness and the detail of the balancing test used to determine the
proper forum. 10 5  The only rigid feature is the requirement that parties apply. for the
determination of the proper adjudicating forum. That flexibility allows a variety of parties
to attack the first forum, but the same flexibility makes results difficult to predict. On the
other hand, a litigant who failed to invoke the Model Act would risk unenforceability in any
other forum where the Act applied and a related case was pending, provided the opponent
succeeded in establishing that the second forum satisfied the balancing test. As with many
balancing tests, this one would work well in the more obvious cases and produce confusion
in the closer ones. In any event, it is a well-thought-out formulation for a difficult problem
and one of the earlier proposals.'
0 6
4. The Complex Litigation Proposals in the United States
Two projects in the United States have addressed the procedural problems arising in
complex litigation. Both discuss the transfer and consolidation of related cases filed in
federal courts, or in state and federal courts, and both are aimed at developing statutory
schemes such as the Multi-District Litigation Statute, found in Section 1407 of Title 28 of
the U.S. Code, which allows for the transfer of complex cases in federal courts for pretrial
purposes.
Neither proposes rules for related cases involving jurisdictions outside of the United
States. However, these remedies could be used in complex parallel disputes involving
multiple courts in the United States and one or more foreign forums. The domestic cases
could be transferred and consolidated, and the foreign case(s) could then be (1) ignored
(that is, allowed to continue to judgment), (2) stayed or dismissed by the foreign court, or
(3) enjoined by the U.S. court. Having stated this, it must also be noted that these proposals
are not intended to be used in complex parallel. disputes, and doing so would, to some
extent, violate their balancing tests. The existence of foreign litigation might dissuade a
U.S. court from applying these remedies.
To the extent that these proposals are not applicable to international litigation, they are
nonetheless examples of multi-jurisdictional remedies for complex parallel litigation. They
are also indicative of the U.S. approach to remedies for parallel litigation; that is, the
proposals are structured toward case-by-case analysis of (1) whether the cases are
sufficiently related, and (2) what ought to be done about it. This approach contrasts with the
general European approach, which is more or less a structured approach that dictates a
specific remedy, such as retaining the first-filed case and dismissing the others.
a. The Federal Judicial Center's Manual for Complex Litigation (Third)
The Manual for Complex Litigation (Third)"°7 is limited to "related cases" within the
United States that involve at least one federal court. This includes intrafederal parallel
104. Id. § 2(a).
105. Id. § 3.
106. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS 215-16 n.12 (1993) [hereinafter ALL COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT]. See generally Teitz, supra note
94, for a general discussion by one of the Model Act's authors.
107. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) (1995) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION MANUAL 3d].
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litigation and state-federal parallel litigation, but not intra-state, interstate, or international
parallel litigation. 10 8 Moreover, the manual does not focus on all parallel litigation
involving a federal court, but merely on "complex cases," that is, litigation involving "one
or more related cases which present unusual problems.., and require extraordinary
treatment .... ,109 The manual deals only in passing with remedies for parallel litigation
and focuses, instead, directly on management aspects of truly complex cases such as class
actions. 110
The manual does not define "related litigation," but provides that related cases may be
identified "on the face of the Complaint";"' l this provision in the manual is identical to the
requirement in the ALIIUNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil
Procedure." l2 The manual further provides that "related cases pending or which may be
later filed in the same court, whether or not in the same division, should be assigned at least
initially to the same judge,"'"13 and encourages consolidation of cases not filed in the same
court by use of Section 1404(a) or Section 1406 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code or, if those do
not apply, under the multidistrict transfer statute, located in Section 1407, for pretrial
purposes only. 114 For related cases filed in state court, the manual recommends removal and
consolidation in a single court or dismissal (voluntary or forum non conveniens) and refiling
in a single federal court.
15
Where consolidation in one federal court is not possible (for personal jurisdiction or
venue reasons), the manual recommends "coordination" of the cases, whether they are all in
federal court" 6 or in federal and state courts.
117
b. The ALI's Complex Litigation Project
The American Law Institute's project on complex litigation' examined the same
issues as the Federal Judicial Center's work in its Complex Litigation Manual 3d but with
broadened scope that included interstate transfer and consolidation. Both projects focus on
the unusual problems presented in truly complex cases, defined here as "the phenomenon of
multiparty, multiforum lawsuits. ' l1l9 The ALl work avoids duplication of several areas
covered in the Complex Litigation Manual 3d120 and limits its coverage to the remedies of
transfer and consolidation. 121 It exceeds the manual's coverage, however, in examining
108. See id. § 10.2, at 5.
109. Id. at 3 (quoting from the first Complex Litigation Manual 3d, and noting the second edition's
abandonment of that description in favor of a functional one highlighting the need in truly complex cases for
judicial management and coordination between courts).
110. Id. §§ 10.1-10.2, at 3-5.
111. Id. § 20.123, at 13.
112. See infra note 181.
113. COMPLEX LITIGATION MANUAL 3d, supra note 107, at 13.
114. Id. §20.123, at 13-14.
115. Id. at14.
116. Id. § 31.14, at 256.
117. Id. § 31.31, at 259.
118. ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 106.
119. Id. at 3.
120. These areas include "scope and management of discovery, organization of counsel in multiparty
actions, trial scheduling, preparation and management, and the administration of certain 'complex' forms of
relief." Id.
121. ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 106, at 1-3.
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122 123transfer and consolidation not only in the intrafederal,22 and state-federal contexts, but
also in the interstate context within an interstate compact.124
As with other parallel litigation laws or proposals, the central feature of the ALI
project's approach to transfer and consolidation is defining "related litigation." The
definition varies here according to the setting. For intrafederal transfers, the actions are
sufficiently related if they "involve one or more common questions of fact and transfer and
consolidation will promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions. 1 25 This is
termed "minimal commonality" and is obviously designed to promote intrafederal
transfer. 126
For federal case transfers to state courts, actions are sufficiently related if "the events
giving rise to the controversy are centered in a single state and a significant portion of the
existing litigation is lodged in the courts of that state.' 27  These criteria do not so much
define the relatedness of the cases, but set the terms for using a state court for pre-trial or
trial consolidation of complex cases. This process of federal-to-state transfer is not
currently possible by direct action but is possible by filing a parallel case in state court and
staying or dismissing the federal action. Because the proposals in'Section 4.01 have not
been implemented, it is unclear whether the inexact definition of relatedness is truly
feasible.
For interstate consolidation, actions are sufficiently related if (1) "common questions
of fact predominate" and (2) "transfer and consolidation will substantially promote the just,
efficient, and fair conduct of the actions and is superior to their separate adjudication."'
128
Again, this definition differs slightly from the others, setting a higher threshold that must be
cleared to justify interstate transfer. This, too, is an experimental definition with no track
record to verify its effectiveness as a viable solution. The ALl project also sets forth the
existing Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act in its Appendix C; it is discussed elsewhere in
this article. 1
29
Finally, for consolidation of state and federal cases in one federal court, the ALl
project proposes an amendment to federal removal jurisdiction that would allow removal of
cases that "arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences as an action pending in the federal court, and share a common question of fact
with that action."' 130 This expansion of removal jurisdiction raises constitutional concerns,
which the ALl addresses by adding a discretionary factor providing for removal of common
issues, related claims, or the entire claim. 13 1 Moreover, in order to make this proposal
conform with Article III of the Constitution, 132 the ALl notes the function of the current
supplemental jurisdiction statute and proposes a conforming amendment that would expand
supplemental jurisdiction beyond the requirement of complete diversity. 33 Within the state-
122. Id. at 21-163.
123. Id. at 165-216 (discussing transfer from federal to state court), 217 (discussing removal from state
court to federal court).
124. See generally id. at 165-216; id. § 4.02, at 201; id. app. B, at 559-674.
125. ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 106, § 3.01(a), at 37.
126. Id. §3.01 cmt. c at 42-44; see also id. § 3.01 cmt. c, at 48-49 nn.6-11.
127. Id. § 4.01(a)(1), at 177; see also id. § 4.01 cmt. e, at 186-91.
128. Id. at Appendix B, proposed Uniform Complex Litigation Act, at 564-65, § 1(a); see also id. cmt. c, at
568-75.
129. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
130. ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 106, § 5.01(a), at 220-21; see also id. § 5.01 cmt. b, at
225-27.
131. Id. § 5.01(c), at 221.
132. Id. § 5.01 cmt. d, at 235.
133. Id. § 5.03 cmt. a, at 256-60.
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to-federal consolidation proposal, the ALI project has a limited discussion of antisuit
injunctions as a means of stopping related litigation that escaped transfer and
consolidation.' 34 Here, the concept of "related litigation" is worded as "transactionally
related proceedings."'1 35 Further discussion calls for a decision based on the presence of
common issues, acknowledging that the decision cannot be "reduced to some formulaic
determination of minimum commonality" but must instead be determined on a case-by-case
basis according to which issues have the "level of commonality" that warrants
consolidation. 136 This approach-a seemingly circular definition of related litigation-is
typical of the U.S. view of parallel litigation generally and differs sharply from the
European approach of formulaic determinations; it is perhaps the hallmark distinction
between the two systems. Labeling this a circular definition is not this author's
condemnation of the case-by-case approach. To the contrary, this article proposes that the
European system goes a bit too far in attempting precise categorizations of disputes
incapable of such pigeonholing.
5. The ALl International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project
The ALl International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project 137 has a limited focus on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and addresses jurisdictional rules only as
a basis for non-recognition of a judgment. 138 The Project's stated purpose is the drafting of
a proposed federal statute governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments,' 39 which currently are done in federal courts under state law.
140
The current draft contains a provision for declining jurisdiction when another action is
pending. The proposed remedy is limited to "identical actions," defined as those actions in
the United States involving the same parties and the same subject matter as an action
pending in the court of a foreign country. 14 1 The identical action remedy provides that the
U.S. court shall stay, or where appropriate, dismiss, the action if (1) the foreign action is
"under jurisdictional principles not prohibited under this statute [sic],' 142 and (2) "the
foreign court ... may be expected to render a judgment entitled to recognition under this
Act [sic].' 143 Then the proposal provides three discretionary exceptions to granting stays or
dismissals of parallel second-filed actions: (1) the foreign court's jurisdiction was invoked
in order to frustrate the exercise of jurisdiction of the court in the United States, (2) the
foreign proceedings are vexatious, or (3)' there are other compelling reasons for the U.S.
court, rather than the foreign court, to resolve the controversy. 144
The commentary following this section of the International Jurisdiction and Judgments
Project notes the close relationship of grounds for declining jurisdiction-under either lis
pendens or forum non conveniens-to the grounds for declining the recognition and
134. Id. § 5.04, at 263.
135. ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 106, § 5.04(a), at 263.
136. Id. cmt. d, at 272; see also § 5.04 cmt. c, at 270-71 nn.8-9.
137. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT (Council Draft
No. 1, Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT].
138. Id. §§2,6.
139. Id. ati.
140. Id. at iii-v (noting that Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), is the only federal pronouncement on the
enforceability of foreign judgments, there being no applicable treaties or statutes). Hilton invoked comity as the
guiding standard, but offered that "[tihe most certain guide ... is a treaty or statute." 159 U.S. at 163.
141. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENT PROJECT § 8(a).
142. Id. § 8(a)(i).
143. Id. § 8(a)(ii).
144. Id. § 8(b).
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enforcement of foreign judgments. It further notes the alternatives of (1) addressing parallel
litigation at the judgment enforcement stage, as proposed by the Conflict of Jurisdiction
Model Act; 145 or (2) at the jurisdictional stage by lis pendens and forum non conveniens, as
proposed here in the International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project. 46 In considering
these jurisdictional-stage remedies, the commentary notes that the instant ALl project
disfavors but does not disallow antisuit injunctions, thereby leaving the decision to
"developing jurisprudence." 147 For the two available remedies-lis pendens and forum non
conveniens-the commentary notes that the starting point is the first-filed rule, citing its use
in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. 14 8  But unlike the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions, the ALl proposal provides three exceptions, as noted above. And unlike the
London-Leuven Principles, the ALl proposal provides judicial discretion to favor the
second-filed U.S. action, rather than following a complicated formula for establishing
priorities for parallel actions. 149
Although this ALl project makes important distinctions for second-filed actions that
should be retained, it offers no express reference to or commentary discussion of the
difference between reactive and repetitive litigation. Repetitive litigation, with the same
plaintiff filing similar or identical actions in multiple forums, should be presumptively
disallowed unless the two-fold plaintiff can justify the duplication. However, its omission
here may be intended under an approach that would leave that factor (repetitive litigation by
plaintiff), and others, to the court's inherent discretion. A more troubling omission is the
lack of any definition of lis pendens, which commonly means identical actions, with the
same parties and claims. In fact, the ALl project expressly defines its parallel litigation
focus as "a proceeding including the same parties and the same subject matter."',
50
Nonetheless, the commentary refers to Posner v. Essex Insurance Co., Ltd.,'51 in which the
cases apparently were not identical, but merely had "significantly common issues and
parties."' 152 One solution is to broaden the scope of lis pendens to significantly related
actions, distinguishing that from merely related actions that might be issue preclusive but
not claim preclusive.
6. The ALl Transnational Insolvency Project (Tentative Draft, April 14, 2000)
The ALl Transnational Insolvency Project 153 is limited to reconciling conflicts in
bankruptcy and other insolvency actions in NAFTA member states-Canada, Mexico, and
the United States. Specifically, Procedural Principle 5 (Reconciliation of Stays) provides
that "[w]here there are parallel proceedings, each NAFTA court should attempt to minimize
conflict between bankruptcy stays"; 54 and "[w]here there are parallel proceedings and a
main proceeding in a NAFTA country has been recognized in a second NAFTA country,
any moratorium or similar order issued in the recognizing country shall apply to conduct in
145. See supra Section 11I.B.3, notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
146. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 137, § 8 cmt. (a).
147. Id. § 8 cmt. (d).
148. Id. § 8 cmt. (c).
149. Id. This sentence reflects the Commentary's view, and not necessarily the author's. The benefit of the
London-Leuven Principles, in setting out the criteria for favoring a second-seized action, is to require the court to
frame its decision around specific factors, while the ALl proposal provides a more open discretion. It is unclear to
this author which method is better.
150. Id. § 8(a).
151. Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209 (I Ith Cir. 1999).
152. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 137, § 8 cmt. (b).
153. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT (Tentative Draft Apr. 14, 2000).
154. Id. Procedural Principle 5(A), at 67.
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a third country only insofar as the conduct is not within the jurisdiction of the main
proceeding."1
55
Additionally, Procedural Principle 6 (Abusive Filings) provides:
When a non-main proceeding is filed in a NAFTA country and the court in that
country determines that country has little interest in its outcome as compared to
the country that is the center of the debtor's main interest, the court should i)
dismiss the bankruptcy case, if dismissal is permitted under its law and no
legitimate interests would be damaged by dismissal or ii) ensure that the
bankruptcy stay arising from the non-main proceeding has no effect outside that
country. 1
56
Because insolvency actions are, for the most part, in rem proceedings, the ALl
Transnational Insolvency Project's proposal must be understood as applying to a limited and
special area of parallel litigation-in rem actions-for which exclusive jurisdiction
ordinarily exists in the first court to secure jurisdiction over the property. As such, these
proposals are consistent with general principles of parallel litigation and are, although well-
drafted and no doubt necessary, nonetheless uncontroversial.'57
C. Proposals from International Groups
1. The Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (Proposed)
The proposed Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters' 5 8 addresses conflicts in both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction and judgments in civil and commercial matters.' 59 It provides the following for
parallel litigation.
a. Lis Pendens
Article 21 is addressed to lis pendens, for which it uses the Brussels Convention
definition of same parties and same cause of action, with the qualifier "irrespective of the
relief sought."' 160 The Hague Convention gives priority to the first-filed case "if the court
first seised has jurisdiction.., and is expected to render a judgment capable of being
155. Id. Procedural Principle 5(B), at 67.
156. Id. Procedural Principle 6, at 69.
157. Compare to the European Union's Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 85.
158. Summary of the outcome of the Discussion in Commission 11 of the First Part of the Diplomatic
Conference (Interim Text, June 6-22, 2001), http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
159. The term "civil and commercial matters" is defined somewhat like the same term in the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions, but with more exclusions. Id. art. 1.1. Article 1.1 excludes "revenue, customs or other
administrative matters." Article 1.2 further excludes status and capacity, maintenance obligations, matrimonial
property and related rights, wills and succession, insolvency, social security, arbitration matters, and admiralty and
maritime matters. Additionally, this article contains proposed exclusions for antitrust and competition claims,
nuclear liability, provisional and. protective matters, in rem claims in immovable property, and the validity or




recognised under the [Hague] Convention in the State of the court second seised .... 161
The second-seized court must stay proceedings until presented with a judgment from the
first-seized court that complies with the Convention's ,recognition or enforcement
provisions, whereupon the second court dismisses its action.
162
Exceptions are where (1) the first case is a declaratory judgment action; 163 (2) the
second-seized court is indicated in an inconvenient forum analysis under Article 22; 164 (3)
the second-filed case was filed pursuant to the parties' choice of forum agreement; 165 (4) a
later-filed case is in a court having exclusive jurisdiction; 166 or (5) the first court fails to
proceed within a reasonable time.'
67
b. Related Litigation
Related litigation is not expressly addressed, but could be included in a forum non
conveniens analysis under Article 22.168
c. Choice of Forum
Article 4 requires courts to honor parties' choice of forum agreements that
presumptively create exclusive jurisdiction unless the parties agree otherwise. 169 Article 4
also defines validity as to form, 170 authorizes written post-contract consent to a different
forum, 171 and uses a renvoi choice-of-law rule by declaring that the law governing forum
clauses is that of the forum state's choice-of-law rule.
172
d. Inconvenient Forum
Article 22 provides for discretionary stays or dismissals on inconvenient forum
grounds,1 73 limited to exceptional circumstances and listing party convenience based on
residence, the location of the evidence and the witnesses, the various limitation or
prescription periods, and judgment enforcement considerations. 174 The issue must be raised
no later than the first defense on the merits175 and does not apply where jurisdiction is based
solely on national law and not on the Hague Convention principles.
176
161. Id.
162. Id. art. 21.2.
163. Hague Convention, supra note 158, art. 21.6 (reversing the first-filed rule and requiring the first-seized
court to stay proceedings until the second-seised court renders a judgment enforceable under the Convention).
164. Id. art. 21.7.
165. Id. art. 21.1 (cross-referencing to the forum selection rules in Article 4).
166. Id. art. 21.1.
167. Id. art. 21.3.
168. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
169. Hague Convention, supra note 158, art. 4.1.
170. Id. art. 4.2.
171. Id. art. 4.3.
172. Id. art. 4.4.
173. Id. art. 22.1.
174. Id. art. 22.2. Interestingly, these factors apparently do not include the public interest factors (the
interests of the forum states and other affected states) found in common law forum non conveniens.
175. Hague Convention, supra note 158, art. 22.1.
176. Id. art. 22.6.
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e. Antisuit Injunctions
The Hague Convention does not provide for antisuit injunctions. Similar to the civil
law remedies and the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, the Hague Convention's reference
to provisional measures does not embrace antisuit injunctions. 177 Provisional measures are
limited to other injunctive relief such as freezing assets. 178 However, the Convention is
ambiguous as to whether it intends to bar antisuit injunctions as a parallel litigation remedy,
or merely defer to local law. This could result in a signatory jurisdiction that allows for
antisuit injunctions, such as the United States, applying them in tandem with the
Convention.
179
2. The ALIIUNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure
The ALl and UNIDROIT are jointly drafting principles and rules for certain types of
international litigation, entitled the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure,'8"
and divided (as of Council Draft No. 1) into twenty-eight broadly stated principles and
thirty-nine more precise rules. Although the topics span litigation from service of process
through appeal and judgment enforcement, reference to parallel litigation was not added
until the current draft. Council Draft No. 1 adds Principle 25 "Lis Pendens and Res
Judicata," which requires in pertinent part that the identity of claims and parties for lis
pendens purposes be determined by the pleadings,18 1 but does not dictate any application of
parallel litigation remedies. At this time, there is no corresponding rule referring to lis
pendens or any other aspect of parallel litigation. The current draft also indirectly refers to
parallel litigation in the provisional measures section, providing that "[iln accordance with
forum law and subject to applicable international conventions, the court may issue an
injunction to restrain or require conduct of any person who is subject to the court's authority
where necessary to preserve the status quo or to prevent irreparable injury pending the
litigation."'8 2 This section presumably authorizes an antisuit injunction in circumstances
limited to these criteria. The guiding standard, and the extent of remedy, is a "principle of
proportionality."1
8 3
3. The London-Leuven Principles on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in Civil
and Commercial Matters
The most thorough and perhaps best-thought-out proposal comes from the
International Law Association's Principles on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in Civil
177. Telephone Interview with Stephen Burbank, a member of the Study Group on Judgment of the U.S.
State Department Advisory Committee on International Law, which advises the U.S. delegation to the Hague
regarding this proposed convention (Dec. 10, 2001); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration,
the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 225-26 n.107 (2001)
[hereinafter Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration].
178. See Hague Convention, supra note 158, art. 13.
179. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 177, at 226 n. 107.
180. AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, ALIiUNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE (Council Draft No. 1, Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.ali.org/ali/aliunidroittrans.htm.
181. Id. princ. 25.1 ("In applying the rules of lis pendens to a proceeding conducted under these principles,
the scope of the proceeding should be determined by the claims and defenses in the parties' pleadings, including
amendments.").




and Commercial Matters,1 84 known as the "London-Leuven Principles" for their drafting
sites. Focused solely on parallel litigation, the London-Leuven Principles strive to provide a
thorough model law for international application.
Sections 1.1 through 1.2 define the London-Leuven Principles' scope as stating the
circumstances for declining original jurisdiction by suspension (stay) or termination
(dismissal) and under specified exceptional circumstances, referring the matter to a court in
another state. 8 5  The implication is that these are exclusive grounds for declining
jurisdiction. The London-Leuven Principles stop short of determining rules of original
jurisdiction, which are a matter of national law with oversight by international law.,
86
The remaining principles set out in detail a proposal for dealing with parallel
litigation. Because of the proposal's thoroughness, it is paraphrased below in detail.
a. Summary of the London-Leuven Principles
Principle 2: Preliminary Matters
2.1 Implementing the Principles: The burden is on party seeking use of convention to
raise a motion in the originating court. The court may not act sua sponte.'
87
2.2 Timeliness: A party must make application at outset of proceedings, and must be
determined by the court on summary proceedings at the earliest opportunity, and in
any event before defendant is required to plead on the merits.
88
2.3 Appeal is made under national law and must be done expeditiously.1
8 9
Principle 3: Jurisdiction-Selecting Clauses
3.1 Prorogation clauses: The parties' exclusive choice must be honored, and the court
may not decline. 190
3.2 Derogation clauses: If parties have chosen another forum as exclusive, then the
originating court shall either terminate on the grounds of no jurisdiction, or as the
case may be, decline jurisdiction. 191
3.3 Non-exclusive choices: If the parties' choice is not exclusive, then the court may hear
the case, or may decline under Principle 4.192
Principle 4: Declining Jurisdiction
4.1 Lis Pendens: The London-Leuven Principles define lis pendens as "proceedings
involving the same parties and the same subject matter,"'193 and require that courts
184. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67.
185. Id. princs. 1.1-1.2.
186. Id. princ. 1.2.
187. Id. princ. 2.1.
188. Id. princ. 2.2.
189. Id. princ. 2.3.
190. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67, princ. 3.1.
191. Id. princ. 3.2.
192. Id. princ. 3.3.
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other than the first-seised stay proceedings until the first-seised court considers the
issues of inconvenient forum under Principle 4.3; once that is done, the proper court
litigates the case and the other courts dismiss the parallel actions. 194 This means the
first-filed (or possibly first-served) action determines which forum will decide where
the lawsuit is to be litigated, subject to its discretion to consult with the other courts.
4.2 Related actions are limited to cases capable of consolidation with a related action in
another forum. 195  Unlike identical actions, related actions have no mandatory
provisions. Instead, any court (including the first-seised) involved in related actions
may choose to address the problem of multiplicity, or may allow the matter to be
adjudicated without interference. 196 A court may stay or dismiss the action, but if it
does so, it must also refer the action to the other court under the standards stated in
Principle 5.197 Thus, related actions may be declined discretionarily without regard
to which was first filed, or to the inconvenient forum factors in Principle 4.3.198
Presumably, related actions incapable of referral and consolidation under Principle 5
may nonetheless be subjected to the inconvenient forum analysis in Principle 4.3.
4.3 Other Grounds for Referral is an inconvenient forum provision, calling for referral
where another forum is "manifestly more appropriate ... taking into account the
interests of all the parties, without discrimination on the grounds of nationality,"'
199
based on the following factors:
(a) the location and language of the parties, witnesses and evidence;
20 0
(b) the balance of advantages of each party afforded by the law, procedure and
practice of the respective jurisdictions;
20 1
(c) the law applicable to the merits;
2 °2
(d) in cases under Principle 4.1 [lis pendens], the desirability of avoiding
multiplicity of proceedings or conflicting judgments having regard to the manner
of resort to the respective court's jurisdiction and the substantive progress of the
respective actions;
20 3
(e) the enforceability of any resulting judgments;
20 4
(f) the efficient operation of the judicial system of the respective
jurisdictions; 20 5 and
(g) any terms of referral under Principle 5.3.206
193. Id. princ. 4.1.
194. Id.
195. Note that under London-Leuven Principles, "related action" is not defined other than as one capable of
consolidation. The Brussels and Lugano Conventions define "related" as "so closely connected that it is expedient
to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgement resulting from separate
proceedings." See Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 22; Lugano Convention, supra note 78, art. 22.
196. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67, princs. 4.1-4.2.
197. Id. princ. 4.2.
198. Id.
199. Id. princ. 4.3.
200. Id. princ. 4.3(a).
201. Id. princ. 4.3(b).
202. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67, princ. 4.3(c).
203. Id. princ. 4.3(d).
204. Id. princ. 4.3(e).
205. Id. princ. 4.3(f).




5.1 For referrals under 4.3 (inconvenient forum), the applicant must show the referring
court that the alternative court (1) "has and will exercise jurisdiction" 20 7 and (2) "is
likely to render judgment on the merits within a reasonable time.,
20 8
5.2 Courts may communicate directly in considering these applications for referral. The
court-to-court communications may be by party application or sua sponte, with the
latter requiring notice to all parties 20 9 The court communications must be in writing
or otherwise on the record and must do so in a language acceptable to the alternative
court.
2 1°
5.3 Parties and the referring court are encouraged to consider the terms to be drafted in
the referral order, including:
(a) "applicant's submission to jurisdiction of the alternative court";
21
V
(b) "terms regarding applicants raising the defenses of limitations or other
prescription of the action in the alternative court. 212
5.4 Except where international convention provides otherwise, the originating court, if
deciding to refer under 5.1, shall either (1) suspend jurisdiction until the jurisdiction
of the alternative court is established; or (2) "where national law provides, terminate
its proceedings. 2z 3
Procedure in the Alternative Court
5.5 The alternative court must decide questions of its own jurisdiction at the outset, and
in any event before defendant is required to plead on the merits.
2 14
5.6 Applicants must transmit the referral order to the alternative court with the
originating court's reasons.2 ,5
5.7 Applicants must inform the originating court of the alternative court's decision
regarding acceptance of the case.216
5.8 If the alternative court declines jurisdiction for any reason, the originating court may
resume jurisdiction.2 17
207. This presumably means that the alternative court will 'not dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
venue, failure to state a claim, similar to common law practice underforum non conveniens. See George, supra
note 1, at 942-50.
208. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67, princ. 5.1 (b).
209. Id. print. 5.2.
210. Id.
211. Id. princ. 5.3(a).
212. Id. princ. 5.3(b).
213. Id. princ. 5.4.
214. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67, princ. 5.5.
215. Id. princ. 5.6.
216. Id. princ. 5.7.
217. Id. princ. 5.8.
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Principle 6: Consequences of Referral
Once the originating or referring court has declined jurisdiction under Principle 3 or
Principle 4, the courts of the originating state may not later decline the enforcement of a
judgment from the alternative court on the grounds of the alternative court's lack of
jurisdiction.
218
Principle 7: Antisuit Injunctions
7.1 Where the states involved are parties to an international convention providing
common rules for the exercise of original jurisdiction, no court may issue an antisuit
injunction.2 19 Each such court must make the sole determination' of (1) its own
jurisdiction and (2) questions regarding the application of these principles.220
7.2 Where there is no applicable international convention, a court may not issue antisuit
injunctions if it is satisfied that these principles will be applied by the other courts in
which identical or related actions are pending.
221
7.3 Courts may issue an antisuit injunction where an exclusive jurisdiction clause has
222been breached under the laws applicable in the courts of both states. (Note the
implication for choice of law here-that is, it is not the law of both states, but the
"law applicable in the courts of both states." 223)
b. Differences between London-Leuven and the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions
The London-Leuven Principles compare most readily to the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions (discussed further in this section as Brussels/Lugano), all three being thorough
in their approaches to parallel litigation. There are, however, several differences. First,
Brussels/Lugano is limited to signatory states in the European Union and the European Free
Trade Association (i.e., in an emerging federal system),224 while London-Leuven aims at
broad international application. 225 The second difference is subject matter: London-Leuven
is narrowly drawn to jurisdictional conflicts, 226 while the Brussels/Lugano Conventions
address all aspects of jurisdiction from creation to execution.
227
Third, London-Leuven differs regarding first-filed actions-while Brussels/Lugano
creates rules and presumptions favoring them 228 London-Leuven (1) subjects identical
actions to forum non conveniens analysis 229 and, thus, does not automatically apply the first-
filed rule, although it does vest the first-filed court with the power to decide where the case
218. Presumably the originating or referring court could decline judgment enforcement on other grounds.
219. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67, princ. 7.1.
220. Id.
221. Id. princ. 7.2.
222. Id. princ. 7.3.
223. Id. princ. 7.3.
224. Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 60; Lugano Convention, supra note 78, art. 60.
225. See generally London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67.
226. Id. princs. 1.1-1.2.
227. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 19; Lugano Convention, supra note 78.
228. See Brussels Convention, supra note 19, arts. 21-23.
229. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67, princ. 4.1.
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should be litigated; 230 (2) provides no first-filed presumption for related actions;2 1 and (3)
provides that related actions capable of consolidation may be discretionarily referred, 232 and
related actions, incapable of consolidation, may apparently be referred under the forum non
conveniens analysis of Principle 4.3.233
Other differences are that London-Leuven: (1) has no provision for resolving multiple
exclusive jurisdiction assertions;234 (2) does not define "related action"; 235 and (3)
authorizes limited antisuit injunctions 236 which Brussels/Lugano either does not allow or
leaves to local law.2 37  Perhaps most notably, London-Leuven does not base parallel
litigation remedies on any likelihood of judgment recognition or preclusion between the
jurisdictions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Civil law codes are applied in a deductive, syllogistic manner based on the code
section's wording. This process has the strength of uniformity and predictability, but has
the weakness that judges applying codes must characterize the dispute in order to fit into a
code provision, resulting sometimes in forced fits.
Common law reasoning, on the other hand, is inductive, flowing from a case's
particular facts to the synthesis of a general rule. Judges are thus allowed greater discretion
in fashioning and modifying rules to fit the result that seems just, at least in the judge's
mind. This process developed a set of rules in parallel litigation with nuances addressing a
variety of situations. But the weakness in this common law process is that discretion and
variety lead to arbitrariness, lack of predictability, and rules that are sometimes canceled out
by contradictions.
However well these imperfect systems have worked domestically, they are ill-suited
for international litigation, where the disadvantages of parallel litigation are magnified. The
current morass of tests in the United States (such as the Colorado River-Landis-comity triad
for stays and dismissals) needs focusing and the elimination of contradiction. The civil law
needs to adopt more flexible rules that account for the great variety of fact settings and
litigation tactics.
A solution is at hand with a combination of the two analytical approaches. Codifying
the common law rules will add uniformity and predictability and lessen contradiction.
Adding the detail and nuance to the civil code rules will lessen their rigidity and occasional
unfairness. This includes distinctions between repetitive and reactive litigation, declaratory
action exceptions to first-filed rules, and increased judicial discretion.
230. Id.
231. Id. princ. 4.2 (lacking any reference to first-filed actions).
232. Id. In comparison, Article 22 of both the Brussels and Lugano Conventions provides for discretionary
dismissal for related actions where consolidation is possible. See Lugano Convention, supra note 77, art. 22;
Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 22.
233. The London-Leuven Principles do not expressly state this, but the author infers it from theforum non
conveniens language in Principle 4.3.
234. See Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 23.
235. Brussels/Lugano defines "related action" as one where preclusion might apply (Article 22), while
London-Leuven merely limits its remedy for related actions to those capable of consolidation (Principle 4.2),
which presumably means those within the same jurisdiction. See Lugano Convention, supra note 77, art. 22;
Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 22.
236. London-Leuven Principles, supra note 67, princs. 7.1-7.3.
237. See Brussels Convention, supra note 19, art. 24.
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Several model laws and treaties already reflect this hybrid approach. As drafters
continue their work, the following suggestions are appropriate.
A. Clarify and Standardize the Terminology
1. Identical Actions
Lis pendens rules often expressly apply only to parallel actions involving the same
parties and the same claims or causes of action. It is far from clear how "same" they must
be to qualify for a stay or dismissal. Must there be a one-to-one identity of parties? Of
claims? If so, parallel remedies are easily avoided by creative use of claim and party
joinder. One suspects that the degree of requisite sameness depends on the judge, thus
giving a degree of discretion both to common law and civil law judges. That is not to say
that discretion is bad, since this article recommends its use, as noted below. But discretion
calls for guidelines, which should include a test for identifying of actions such as "same
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences" 238 or "likely to result in
claim preclusion for some or all of the claims. '239 There are no doubt other good ones, but
something is needed to focus the court's assessment on claim identity.
2. Related Actions
Some treaties and model laws do not refer to related actions, and it may not be
necessary if the definition of "same claim" is sufficiently broad to cover closely related, but
not perfectly identical claims. However, there may be some parallel cases in which claim
preclusion will not result, but issue preclusion will, with significant effects on the related
litigation that ought to be eligible for a remedy. If remedies for related litigation are not
available, a litigant could seek an advantage by filing a related claim in a friendlier and
speedier forum, containing an element whose resolution would be dispositive of the first
litigation.
3. First-Filed and First-Seized
In the United States, courts sometimes apply a presumption favoring the first-filed
suit, 240 and this apparently means what it says-the date of filing of the plaintiffs complaint
with the court clerk. There are no known cases in the United States where this is a problem.
In Europe however, the Brussels Convention has a somewhat all-but-conclusive rule
238. This is the test for permissive party joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, and more
importantly, the most popular of the common law tests for the "same claim" element of claim preclusion. See,
e.g., Saud v. Bank of New York, 929 F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir. 1991); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24 (1981); 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 2D § 4407 (2d ed.
1981). The Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act uses this test.
239. See Hague Convention, supra note 158, art. 2.1; INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
PROJECT, supra note 137, art. 8(a)(ii); § 328 ZPO (F.R.G.), discussed in FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 196-97;
Miniera di Fragne Case, Nov. 26, 1974, 1 Cass. civ. 1975, 491 (Fr.), discussed in FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 181;
see also RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 104 (3d ed. 1998), discussed in
George, supra note 1, at 774. Note that the London-Leuven Principles do not rely on judgment recognition as a
basis for parallel remedies.
240. See sources cited supra note 21.
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favoring the "first-seised" case, and the date that a case is seized depends on local law.241 In
Sweden, the court is seised of jurisdiction when the case is filed,242 but in Germany,
jurisdiction is not seized until the defendant is served. 43 This has significant consequences
in races to the courthouse because the Brussels Convention's lis pendens rule favors the
"court first seised.,, 244 The United Kingdom had a similar seized-when-filed rule prior to
reinterpretation in 1992.245 When a party sues a defendant in a German court but does not
immediately perfect service of process, the defendant can quickly sue in Sweden (assuming
the German plaintiffs amenability), and if the Swedish filing predates the German service
of process, the Swedish case prevails and the earlier-filed German case must be
dismissed.246 It would seem that countries (especially those in a treaty system) could
subordinate their laws to the need for a common definition of the court's acquisition of
jurisdiction. This is done correctly in the proposed Hague Convention.
247
4. Stay, Dismiss, and Abate
Abatement: is a confusing term in U.S. usage, capable of meaning either a stay
(temporary cessation) or a dismissal (permanent cessation). The confusion apparently stems
from abatement's different meanings in law and equity, as Justice Story explained in
1848.248 The easy solution is not to use "abatement" in parallel litigation remedies having
interstate or international implications, and instead, use the terms "stay" and "dismiss."
B. Clarify the Treaty/Model Law's Relation to Local Law
Some of the treaties and model laws have gaps that create legal uncertainties. Does
the absence of reference to forum non conveniens or antisuit injunctions mean that those
remedies are no longer available in disputes covered by this law, or does the gap merely
express deference to local law? This problem has a two-part solution.
1. Promote Uniformity
The treaty or model law should ideally be as self-contained as possible, with minimal
deference to local law on crucial issues like when the case is first-seized 249 (as discussed in
the first recommendation) or the availability of antisuit injunctions.25 °
241. See Brussels Convention, supra note 19, arts. 21-23.
242. Swed. Code of Jud. Proc., ch. 13, s. 4 (discussed in FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 34, 376).
243. FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 198-99.
244. Brussels Convention, supra note 20, art. 21.
245. Dresser UK Ltd. V. Falcongate Ltd. [1992] 1 Q.B. 502, 523 (Bingham L.J.).
246. See Fawcett, supra note 7, at 198-99.
247. See Hague Convention, supra note 158, art. 21.5.
248. "[ln the sense of Courts of Equity, an abatement signifies only a present suspension of all proceedings
in the suit from the want of proper parties capable of proceeding therein. At the common law, a~suit, when abated,
is absolutely dead." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADING § 354 (1848). Many states seized on
one or the other meaning of abatement, resulting in different meanings in different states. This is reflected even in
Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "Abatement of action" as "an entire overthrow or destruction of the suit so
that it is quashed and ended." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (6th ed. 1990). However, Black's defines "Plea in
abatement" as something that "merely suspends or postpones its prosecution." Id. at 1151-52.
249. See supra Part IIf.A. 1 (a), notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
250. See infra Part B.2 and note 251.
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2. Clarify the Treaty/Model Law's Preemptive Function, or Alternatively, its
Deferential Function
Where local law is applicable, one must clarify the treaty/model law's interplay with
local law. Confusion has resulted where treaties, such as the Brussels Convention, omit
mention of a key component of parallel litigation, such as antisuit injunctions. The omission
leads to contrary interpretations that (1) the Convention preempts local law in signatory
states and the omitted remedy is no longer available in cases governed by the Convention or
(2) the Convention simply failed to address the issue and local law may supplement the
Convention. This dispute is currently underway between the United Kingdom and Spain,
and no doubt other Brussels signatories that do not authorize antisuit injunctions.
251
C. Harmonize the Remedies
It may be asking too much of civil law jurisdictions to alter local law to accommodate
such drastic remedies as antisuit injunctions, or of common law jurisdictions to forego that
remedy. One solution may be to limit the use of such antisuit injunctions to standards
similar to those under the United States Anti-Injunction Act, which limits federal courts'
enjoining actions in state courts. 252 Under the Act, a federal injunction against state-court
litigation must satisfy one of three categories: (1) expressly authorized by Congress; (2)
necessary to protect in rem jurisdiction; or (3) necessary to protect or effectuate a final
judgment. 253  Federal law also requires that the injunction satisfy equity standards of
irreparable harm and no adequate remedy at law.254 If, for example, the Act were modified
to apply to international litigation with the first category eliminated, then antisuit injunctions
would be appropriate only to protect in rem jurisdiction or to protect an existing, final
judgment. Neither of these should be terribly controversial under existing parallel litigation
standards, since the first category (in rem jurisdiction) is widely accepted as exclusive
jurisdiction, and the second category does not involve pending parallel litigation. If this
limited injunctive remedy were coupled with an effective lis pendens rule to stay or dismiss
identical or substantially related litigation, and if the lis pendens motion had to be filed
within thirty to sixty days of the second suit's filing (or amendment that added a
substantially related claim), then antisuit injunctions might not be deemed as necessary as
they are now in the United States.
In turn, if this were combined with an effective and standardized forum non
conveniens rule, along with standards for recognizing forum selection clauses (in both
prorogation and derogation instances), then we might have a reasonably workable set of
remedies for international parallel litigation, as follows:
Do nothing and accept the preclusion consequences, if any. This approach
emphasizes each party's right to litigate in a chosen forum, except in cases
that are either identical or so similar that private interests and public policies
call for a remedy.
251. See Turner v. Grovit, [2002] 1 All E.R. 320 (H.L. 2001), in which the House of Lords ruled that an
English court could enjoin a Spanish lawsuit that would have relitigated issues already litigated in an English
action. Antisuit injunctions are authorized under English law, Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. Lee
Kui Jak, 1 A.C. 871 (H.L. 1987), but are not mentioned in Spanish law or the Brussels Convention. See Turner,
[2002] 1 All. E.R. 320.





* Transfer and consolidate parallel cases. Ifforum non conveniens were more
accepted, it could lead to international transfer agreements that would be
more effective than the current dismissal model.
* Move for a stay. Where transfer is inappropriate or unavailable, and a
dismissal risks parties' rights (or possibly forum state interests), then a stay
is appropriate, presumptively of the latter-filed action.
* Move for a dismissal. These are appropriate where (1) another forum has
exclusive jurisdiction under the standards imposed by the treaty or model
law; or (2) where the plaintiff has filed, either first or second, in bad faith.
* File for an antisuit injunction. If limited to protecting in rem jurisdiction
and final judgments, and, with the hope that the other forum would dismiss
its case in either circumstance, the controversial antisuit injunction should
be almost unnecessary.
D. Use Both Bright-Line and Multifaceted Tests
Use bright-line categories and rules where they produce fair results with reasonable
consistency. This recommendation includes in rem cases involving movables (and possibly
other in rem cases), status determinations such as custody and competency, and private
actions involving public policy issues such as anti-trust violations. Do not rely on fixed
tests in the many areas where they are capable of undermining a party's or the forum's
legitimate interests. If a governmental interest analysis is unacceptable in these tests, do not
use it, but do not let that eliminate balancing tests altogether. Moreover, consider the
aspects of government interest analysis-the factors focused on evidence, convenience,
docket burden, and so on are easy to apply. Those based on assessing the forum's policy
interests behind its substantive law are more difficult to apply.
E. Consider the Nature of the First-Filed Suit
Parallel litigation rules should distinguish between (1) identical litigation and related
litigation; (2) reactive litigation and repetitive litigation (same plaintiff in both); and (3)
plaintiff-driven litigation and anticipatory litigation (declaratory judgments). In particular,
declaratory actions and repetitive suits are inherently suspect, although even here a rigid test
will work unfair results in some cases. A presumption .against these actions is more
appropriate. Parallel litigation remedies should also take into account special rules that
develop around certain subject matter, such as patent litigation.
F. Use Presumptions
Presumptions are appropriate (1) against repetitive suits unless a plaintiff shows a
reason; (2) against declaratory suits, especially second-filed declaratory suits; (3) in favor of
exclusive forum clauses; (4) in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum in the absence of a
forum clause; and (5) where none of these factors is present, in favor of the first-filed action.
20021
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G. Prefer a Discretionary Standard in Most Instances
Judicial discretion goes hand-in-hand with presumptions and multi-factored tests.
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V. APPENDIX: THE VOCABULARY OF PARALLEL LITIGATION




Two or more lawsuits with sufficient identity of parties and
claims that a decision in one is likely to have a preclusive
effect on some or all of the claims in the remaining suit. This
meaning thus embraces both parallel actions with identical
claims and parties, and ones not perfectly identical but
strongly related with a significant overlap of parties and
claims. Note that the test is one of claim preclusion, but might
in some circumstances include issue preclusion for instances
where an issue would be dispositive in the other litigation and
would result in significant hardship or unfairness. 255 This is
not to say that a likelihood of issue preclusion is always
appropriate grounds for a stay or dismissal. Rather, it should
be limited to cases where important issues should be
determined in primary litigation (like property title, probate,
bankruptcy, etc.) rather than in ancillary litigation. The mere
existence of an issue preclusion possibility is not, by itself, a
significant factor and should not lead to a treatment of
multiple cases as "parallel" unless other factors are present.
A category of parallel litigation in which the defendant in the
first action files a separate suit against the plaintiff in the first
action, seeking a declaratory judgment of nonliability in the
first action256 or asserting a claim that arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the first suit. 257  In the two
lawsuits, both plaintiffs may believe their respective choice of
forum to be the more appropriate (or essential to success), and
both may be reluctant to forego their choice of forum, even
where the entire lawsuit may be litigable in one court.
A category of parallel litigation involving multiple suits on the
same claim by the same plaintiff(s) against the same
defendant(s). 258 This category includes multiple-but-separate
actions by class members on the same cause of action raised in
the class action, seeking to represent the same or a similar
254. This definition is an alteration of the one in Marcus & Sherman, supra note 239, which limits parallel
litigation to situations where claim preclusion will necessarily result, while I prefer to use the term for situations in
which claim preclusion is likely, since one forum cannot always predict preclusion in another.
256. Wm. Gluckin & Co. v. Int'l Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1969); Tex. Liquor Control Bd. v.
Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1970).
257. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Kingston Investors Corp., 819 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1991, no writ); see Allan D. Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REv. 11 (1961).
258. See, e.g., Semmes v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970); Foyt v. Championship Auto
Racing Teams, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. Tex. 1996); see Allan D. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L.
REv. 525 (1960).
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Derivative Litigation:
class.259  There are many reasons for a party to file two
lawsuits in the same matter. Three are (1) the plaintiff
anticipates a real or imagined jurisdictional flaw in the first
lawsuit and files the second to beat the limitation period; (2)
the first forum makes a preliminary ruling that displeases the
plaintiff; or (3) without any ruling or action by the first forum,
the plaintiff experiences "post-filing dissonance" from
discomfort with the judge, the type of court, the locale, or
some other aspect of the first lawsuit. Plaintiffs who file a
second lawsuit in the same matter often file a voluntary
dismissal or nonsuit in the first case. Some do not, however,
and that leads to repetitive parallel litigation and possibly
reactive litigation. For example, assume that P sues D in
Forum A, and D then counterclaims against P. P now decides
that Forum A is undesirable-because of the judge, locale,
type of court, a bad preliminary ruling, or P's intuition-and
files a second lawsuit in Forum B that provides what P
perceives as a better setting. Now we have two affirmative
claimants, each desiring a distinct forum, in what are now
reactive suits that may both be aggressively pursued.26 °
Some disputes involving multiple litigation are not truly
parallel or duplicative, but instead involve an underlying suit
with a later derivative. Two examples are (1) an underlying
action for liability where the defendant's insurer files a
derivative declaratory action to assert nonliability;261 and (2)
an underlying action in which a plaintiffs attorney has
allegedly committed malpractice, and plaintiffs immediate
derivative action for malpractice filed before the underlying
action is final.262 These multiple disputes are neither reactive
or repetitive; they often do not lend themselves to resolution
under the standard remedies for parallel litigation, and instead
may have distinct tests. This category of multiple lawsuits is
generally not addressed here.
Terms Relating to Remedies for Parallel Litigation
Antisuit Injunctions: Antisuit injunctions are orders directing a party in one court not
to pursue parallel litigation in another court. References to
"provisional measures" in treaties and model laws may include
authority for antisuit injunctions. Note that this remedy calls for
a court to issue an order relating to litigation in another court,
while other remedies (stay and dismissal) affect only the
259. Katz v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975).
260. See, e.g., Semmes, 429 F.2d 1197; Accelerated Christian Educ., Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 925 S.W.2d 66
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
261. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993).





Lis Pendens and Lis
Alibi Pendens:
litigation in the court imposing the remedy.
Dismissal (or termination) is the final disposal of a case that
does not ordinarily allow for reactivation. Termination is the
equivalent term in some European and international usage.
Dismissal or termination as a remedy for parallel litigation
would, of course, not be on the merits. Dismissal may not be the
preferred option because it (1) terminates a lawsuit with proper
jurisdiction and venue; (2) upends the timetable in that case; and
(3) assumes the existence of a perfect identify with the parallel
case, or at least sufficiently similar that no claims are lost or
other prejudice results. Dismissal is available in several forms
in most jurisdictions, including voluntary dismissals (either
unilaterally by plaintiff or by stipulation) and involuntary
dismissals based on lis pendens, forum clauses, and forum non
conveniens.
The first-filed (or first-seized) rule is the rule (or sometimes
presumption) that the case filed first should control forum
selection, and that later-filed cases should be transferred (if
possible), stayed, dismissed, or enjoined. In common law
jurisdictions, it is a presumption that the first plaintiffs choice
of forum controls-absent special circumstances such as a
forum selection clause exclusively designating another forum,
lack of jurisdiction over property, the bad faith filing of a
declaratory action in the first forum, and other exceptions. In
civil law jurisdictions, it operates as part of a fixed lis pendens
rule that is more mechanically applied and may give priority to
the "first-seised court," that is, the one first obtaining
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter. In all
jurisdictions, the rule or presumption operates most effectively
to remedy parallel litigation in the same state or country, or
among signatories to a treaty, such as the Brussels Convention,
and may not apply to interstate, state-federal, or international
litigation.
These terms have multiple related meanings and functions.
Under U.S. common law, lis pendens (suit pending) is a
notification filed in the public records to give the public notice
that a lawsuit is pending, with the result that non-parties now
may be bound by the eventual results. 263 One example is notice,
filed in the property deed records, of a pending lawsuit claiming
title to land, such that non-parties who may acquire title do so
subject to the results of the legal claim.
Lis alibi pendens (suit pending elsewhere) 264 is a special
category of lis pendens notice, providing notice of a parallel
action. It is used as the basis for a motion to stay or dismiss one
263. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 942-42 (7th ed. 1999).
264. Id. at 942.
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of the actions. In several treaties and model laws originating
outside the United States, the term lis pendens embraces lis alibi
pendens, and its usage implies that the multiple suits must be
perfectly identical in order for the doctrine to apply.
265
Stay: A stay (or suspension) is a court's action temporarily stopping
its own case, allowing for later reactivation if circumstances
justify. "Suspension" is the equivalent term in some
European266 and international 267 usage. However, the term
"stay" is not entirely clear. It is sometimes used to mean a
temporary suspension imposed by another court, either on a
party or a court. One example is a bankruptcy court's automatic
"stay" of related civil proceedings, and another is the editor's
title choice for the federal Anti-Injunction Act, which is termed
a "Stay of State Court Proceedings. 268 This may be a legitimate
meaning for stay, but it is less confusing to limit the term to a
court's self-imposed suspension of proceedings. The procedure
in parallel litigation is to ask one of the courts to suspend
prosecution of its own action, pending resolution of the other
case. If the other case becomes final (that is, if it is decided on
the merits by a competent court and becomes final under the law
of the rendering state or country), it should have a preclusive
effect as to the stayed action, which can then be dismissed. On
the other hand, if the parallel case does not result in a valid and
final judgment on the merits, then the stayed case may be
revived and litigated. If circumstances change during the stay, it
may be lifted for good cause (although there are no examples of
this in stays imposed based on parallel litigation).
An important distinction must be made between stays and
dismissals. Dismissals are preferred over stays for parallel
litigation within the same jurisdiction, while stays are preferred
over dismissals (if a remedy is available at all) for parallel cases
in multiple jurisdictions. This rule is logical; the use of
dismissals for local duplication is more economical, while the
use of stays for interjurisdictional conflicts reflects courts'
greater reluctance to extinguish a case and expose the local
plaintiff to the mercy of a distant forum. Stays provide
protection by reviving the case in the event of problems in the
other forum. Where dismissals are available in
interjurisdictional conflicts the test is a heightened one, often
linked to forum non conveniens analysis. 269 The test for stays,
on the other hand, may be as simple as the first-filed rule. One
exception to the no-dismissal rule is for in rem cases, where
265. See Brussels Convention, supra note 20, art. 21.
266. See, e.g., § 148 ZPO (F.R.G.), discussed in FAWCETT, supra note 7, at 197.
267. See Hague Convention, supra note 158, art. 21(1); London-Leuven Principles, supra note 68, princ.
4.1.
268. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (1994).
269. See White Light Prods., Inc. v. On The Scene Prods., Inc., 660 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. e (1971).
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courts will generally dismiss in deference to the court first
assuming control over the property.
Transfer: Transfer (or referral) is the movement of a case from one court
to another, possible only within the same jurisdiction, or
pursuant to a treaty to which the transferor and transferee states
are signatories. Transfers are used primarily to correct improper
venue within a jurisdiction, or in response to an
intrajurisdictional forum non conveniens motion, but are also
used to transfer a parallel case and consolidate it with another in
the same jurisdiction.
Other Terms
Forum Selection A clause in a contract that designates a forum for litigation or
Clause: arbitration. Forum clauses may further be described as:
(a) Exclusive forum clause: choosing one forum and
eliminating all others
(b) Permissive or non-exclusive foruim clause: lacking
the exclusive language, and generally enforceable if sued
upon, but not necessarily sufficient to mandate a change of
forum if one party sues in a different forum where
defendant is amenable.
(c) General forum clause: choosing a geographic
location, such as "Texas" or "England."
(d) Specific forum clause: choosing a particular court
within the geographic location, such as "the London Court
of Justice" 270 or "the California Superior Court for the
County of Orange.",
271
(e) Prorogation and derogation clauses: A prorogation
clause supports the filing in a given forum. If the parties'
clause designates Florida and plaintiff files his action in a
state or federal court in Florida, followed by defendant's
challenge to personal jurisdiction, the clause is a
prorogation clause supporting plaintiffs filing (although
not necessarily mandating the outcome).272 A derogation
clause undermines a plaintiffs filing in a particular forum.
If the forum clause designates England and plaintiff files in
a court in Texas, then the clause is a derogation clause.
270. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
271. Int'l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1996).
272. See Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916 (11 th Cir. 1989).
273. See George, supra note 1, at 924, 938-41.
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274. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1993).
275. E.g., TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
Whether a clause is prorogation or derogation has
implications for amenability, the law governing the clause,
and possibly other issues.
273
A common law invention enabling a defendant to seek dismissal
in the instant forum for refiling in defendant's choice of forum,
based on significant inconvenience and a balancing of the
parties' interests and the affected states' interests. In the United
States, the remedy is now codified for intrafedera 274 and most
intrastate275 practice, but remains common law for interstate and
international disputes. It is largely unrecognized by civil law
jurisdictions, but is making progress in litigation-oriented
treaties and model laws.
In this article, the term was used and spelled as each specific law
used that term. When applied to jurisdiction (as here), the term
means "perfected" according to the author's translation. In
other words, a court is seised or seized with jurisdiction
whenever the last act necessary to perfect jurisdiction occurs. In
some states (e.g. England and U.S. federal courts), this last act
occurs when the lawsuit is filed with the clerk of the court. In
other states (e.g., Germany, Kansas, Oklahoma), the last act
occurs when the defendant is served process.
In this discussion, the concept of "seised" turns on personal
jurisdiction because the term as used here refers to the court's
power over the defendant. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note
that this same concept of the court's being properly "seised" is
also a subject matter jurisdiction concept (having to do with the
proper invocation of the court's power) and a venue concept
(having to do with the propriety of one court's litigating the
claim instead of another court.)
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